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A PURCHASER'S RIGHTS IN THE
MIDDLEMAN ESCROW
The recent decision in Majewsky v. Empire Construction Co.'
harshly delimits the rights of innocent purchasers in California. This
case involved the instantaneous conveyance of real property from A to
B to C, and raised the question whether judgment liens against B attached to the property during the transaction, taking priority over the
interest obtained by C, a bona fide purchaser. In affirming the trial
court despite two vigorous dissents, 2 the supreme court held that the
interest acquired by B in the real property during this transaction was
sufficient to support the attachment of judgment liens, and consequently,
C's interest in the property was subject to these liens. This Note will
attempt to isolate the controlling issues in Majewsky, to determine the
correctness of the court's disposition of the case, and to consider the
merits of alternative theories advanced to support a different result.
The Majewsky Decision
The situation in Majewsky, in somewhat greater detail, involved
an action by Adolfo and Consuaelo Majewsky (party C) to quiet title
as against judgment liens claimed by the defendant, judgment creditors
of Allen and Dorothy Waugh (party B). Irving and Beatrice Cuslidge
(party A), the original owners of Blackacre, entered into an agreement
with the Waughs, judgment debtors, whereby the latter agreed to purchase the property for $11,000. Waugh, seeking to resell the property
at a profit, contacted a real estate broker, who in turn contacted the
plaintiffs. After a preliminary title check, the Majewskys entered into an
agreement with the Waughs to purchase the property for $12,500. The
names of Allen and Dorothy Waugh, the intermediate parties, did not
appear on the agreement, however, which was signed by the broker
as "agent for sellers." 3 Thus the Majewskys were unaware that the
Waughs were involved in the transaction and assumed that they were
purchasing the property directly from the Cuslidges, whose names were
given as owners on the preliminary title report. Both agreements, along
with the purchase money advanced entirely by the Majewskys, were deposited in the same escrow, which was closed with title passing instantaneously from the Cuslidges (A) to the Waughs (B) to the Ma1. 2 Cal. 3d 478, 467 P.2d 547, 85 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1970).
2. Id. at 486, 489, 467 P.2d at 553, 555, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 825, 827.
3. Id. at 481, 467 P.2d at 549, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
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jewskys (C). The money flowed in the opposite direction, with the
Waughs, the broker, and the title company each exacting a profit.4
The dispositive issue in Majewsky is whether judgment liens,
against the Waughs amounting to over $50,000 attached to Blackacre
as title passed through them. This question may be resolved by determining the interest the Waughs acquired during the transaction.
Since judgment liens are solely the product of statute,5 the interests to
which they will attach are limited by the statute creating them. In
California, a judgment lien will attach only to "the real property of
the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, . . . owned by him
at the time, or which he may afterward and before the lien expires,
acquire .. ."0 California courts have consistently construed the
term "real property" quite strictly when used in connection with judgment liens. For a judgment lien to attach, the judgment debtor must
have a vested legal interest in the real property in question.7 A judgment lien will not attach to a mere equitable interest in land,8 such as

that obtained by a vendee under a contract for purchase of real property.'

Nor will a judgment lien attach to naked legal title,"0 such as

that held by a trustee under a trust"x or by a vendor under a purchase
agreement for real property.

2

Therefore, if the Waughs' interest were

anything less than a fully merged "real property" interest-if it were
4. Id. at 480-83, 467 P.2d at 549-50, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 821-22.
5. Boggs v. Dunn, 160 Cal. 283, 116 P. 743 (1911); Ackley v. Chamberlain,
16 Cal. 181 (1860).
6. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 674.
7. People ex rel. Ford v. Irwin, 14 Cal. 428 (1859); Cook v. Huntley, 44 Cal.
App. 2d 635, 641, 112 P.2d 889, 892 (1941); Belieu v. Power, 54 Cal. App. 244, 247,
201 P. 620, 621 (1921).
8. Homeland Bldg. Co. v. Reynolds, 49 Cal. App. 2d 176, 178, 121 P.2d 59, 61
(1942); Cook v. Huntley, 44 Cal. App. 2d 635, 641, 112 P.2d 889, 892 (1941);
Poindexter v. Los Angeles Stone Co., 60 Cal. App. 686, 687-88, 214 P. 241, 242 (1923);
Belieu v. Power, 54 Cal. App. 244, 247, 201 P. 620, 621 (1921).
9. Oaks v. Kendall, 23 Cal. App. 2d 715, 719, 73 P.2d 1255, 1257 (1937);
Belieu v. Power, 54 Cal. App. 244, 247, 201 P. 620, 621 (1921).
10. Wheeler v. Trefftzs, 228 Cal. App. 2d 271, 274, 39 Cal. Rptr. 507, 509
(1964); Schriber v. Title Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 700, 707, 320 P.2d 82, 86
(1958); Spear v. Farwell, 5 Cal. App. 2d 111, 114, 42 P.2d 391, 392-93 (1935);
Iknoian v. Winter, 94 Cal. App. 223, 225, 270 P. 999, 1000 (1928); Riverdale Mining
Co. v. Wicks, 14 Cal. App. 526, 536, 112 P. 896, 900 (1910).
11. Riverdale Mining Co. v. Wicks, 14 Cal. App. 526, 536-37, 112 P. 896, 900
(1910); Zenda Mining & Milling Co. v. Tiffin, 11 Cal. App. 62, 65-66, 104 P. 10,
12 (1909).
12. In re Estate of Reid, 26 Cal. App. 2d 362, 369, 79 P.2d 451, 456 (1938); Hunt
v. Inner Harbor Land Co., 61 Cal. App. 271, 214 P. 998, 999 (1923), holding that the
vendor under an executory contract to convey land retains mere naked title. In all cases
where a judgment debtor holds only naked legal title, judgment liens cannot attach.
See cases cited in note 10 supra.
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a mere equitable interest, or naked legal title-then no judgment liens
could have properly attached.
The supreme court held that the interest acquired by the Waughs
was a fee simple absolute. They were not involuntary trustees of either a resulting or constructive trust, because the facts of the case did
not support the conclusion that either trust had been created. 1 3 Moreover, because the agreement between the Cuslidges and the Waughs
was not expressly conditioned upon the execution of the Waugh-Majewsky contract, the Waughs could not be considered a mere conduit
for passage of title. 4 Therefore, the court concluded that when title
was transferred to the Waughs in the escrow, they became the "actual
owners," if only momentarily, and the judgment liens attached.' 5
Alternative Dispositions of the Case
There are three possible theories under which the court in Majewsky might have concluded that the Waughs did not acquire the interest necessary to support a judgment lien, viz: resulting trust, constructive trust, or equitable conversion.
A. The Resulting Trust Theory
A resulting trust may arise by operation of law in three distinctly
different factual situations: where an express trust fails; where an express trust does not exhaust the trust estate; or where property is transferred to one person and the purchase price is paid by another. 6 Only
the last situation, which may give rise to what is called a purchase
money resulting trust, is relevant to a discussion of the Majewsky case.
In California, the purchase money resulting trust is a statutory creation:
When a transfer of real property is made to one person, and the
consideration therefor is paid by or for another, a trust is presumed to result7 in favor of the person by or for whom such payment is made.'
The requisites of this statute are apparently satisfied by the facts
of the case. The property was transferred from the Cuslidges to the
Waughs, while the consideration therefor was supplied entirely by the
Majewskys. Therefore, dissenting Justice Mosk contended, as a matter
13. Majewsky v. Empire Constr. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 478, 485-86, 467 P.2d 547,
552-53, 85 Cal. Rptr. 819, 824-25 (1970). These theories, and the reasons why the
court concluded they were inapplicable to the facts at bar, are discussed in greater detail in the text accompanying notes 16-45 infra.
14. Id. at 482-84, 467 P.2d at 550-51, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23.
15. Id. at 484, 467 P.2d at 551, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
16. See 4 G. BOGERT, ThaE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 451 at 498 (2d ed.
1964); 5 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRusTs § 404.1 at 3214 (3d ed. 1967).
17. CAL. CIv. CODE § 853.
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of law, a trust should be presumed to result in favor of the Majewskys,
who paid the purchase money.'
The court, however, refused to evoke
the presumption; the reason for its refusal becomes clear only after the
relationship between the parties is evaluated.
For a resulting trust to arise, it must be evident from the conduct
of the parties that the payor intended that the transferee act as trustee." In fact, it is their relationship which gives rise to the inference
of intent.2 0 This intent need not be specifically mentioned, either
orally or in writing. 2' Indeed, if it were expressly stated, an express
trust rather than a resulting trust might arise. But the intent must be
apparent from the behavior of the settlor,2 and generally it is required
that this intent be shared by both the transferee and the payor.2 3 One
California court explained the relevance of the conduct and relationship of the parties to the creation of a resulting trust in the following
manner:
A resulting trust is not founded on the simple fact that money or
property of one has been used by another to purchase property. It
is founded on a relationship of the two, on the fact that as between
them, consciously and intentionally, one has advanced the consideration wherewith to make a purchase in the name of the other.
The trust arises because it is the natural presumption in such a
case that it was their intention that the ostensible purchaser should
acquire and
hold the property for the one with whose means it was
24
acquired.
In Majewsky, however, there was no relationship between the
Waughs (the transferees) and the Majewskys (the payors). Unaware
that the Waughs were their immediate grantors, or that their money
was in effect used to transfer title to the Waughs, the Majewskys could
not have intended that the Waughs acquire the land for the payors'
benefit. When the Majewskys transferred the money under the sales
contract, they believed that they would receive the entire interest in the
land in return. In fact, they were unaware that title had passed through
18.
19.

2 Cal. 3d at 487, 467 P.2d at 553, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 825 (1970).
Lezinsky v. Mason Malt Whiskey Distilling Co., 185 Cal. 240, 251, 196 P. 884,

890 (1921); accord, Berniker v. Berniker, 30 Cal. 2d 439, 447, 182 P.2d 557, 562-63

(1947); Seabury v. Costello, 209 Cal. App. 2d 640, 645, 26 Cal. Rptr. 248, 251
(1962); 4 G. BOGERT, THE LAw oF TRusTS Am TRusTEs § 454 at 517 (2d ed. 1964);
5 A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 404.2 at 3215 (3d ed. 1967).

20. "[Tlhe intention is inferable, as has been said, from the conduct of the parties
and lack of family relationship." Jackson v. Jackson, 150 Ga. 544, 546, 104 S.E. 236,
237 (1920).
21. 4 G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TnusTEEs § 454, at 517 (2d ed. 1964).
22.
23.

Id.
Love v. Watkins, 40 Cal. 547, 568 (1871); Basket v. Crook, 86 Cal. App. 2d

355, 362, 195 P.2d 39, 44 (1948).
24. Lezinsky v. Mason Malt Whiskey Distilling Co., 185 Cal. 240, 251, 196
P. 884, 890 (1921).
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the Waughs until months later. 5 It is therefore meaningless to argue
that it was the intent of the parties that the Waughs would act as the
Majewskys' trustee when the payors did not know of the existence of
the transferees.
Furthermore, it is well settled that there can be no resulting trust
if the payor has not consented to the vesting of legal title in the transferee.2 0
It is only then that the payor will expect the grantee to be a trustee
for him. If [the payor's] money pays for land but without his
consent the deed for it is made out to someone else, there is no
room for 2presuming
that [he] wanted that person to be a trustee
7
for [him].
It is, of course, clear that the Majewskys did not consent to the vesting
of any interest, either legal or equitable, in the Waughs. As discussed
above, the Majewskys were not apprised of the Waughs' role in the
transaction until several months later. Thus, for the same reason that it
cannot be argued that the Majewskys intended that the Waughs act as
their trustee, it is not possible to maintain that the Majewskys, as payors,
consented to the transfer of legal title to the Waughs.
According to the court,2 8 the Second Restatement of Trusts was
dispositive of the argument that a trust had resulted:
[W]hen a transfer of property is made to one person and the purchase price thereof is paid by him with money or other property
belonging to another with the consent of the latter, a resulting
trust arises in his favor.
If the other person did not consent to the use of his money or
other property in making the purchase, or did not consent that the
property purchased should be transferred to 29the transferee, a constructive trust and not a resulting trust arises.
The court, however, held that there was no constructive trust for
reasons which will be analyzed in the following section.
B. The Constructive Trust Theory
The constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed on wrongfully acquired property to prevent unjust enrichment.3 ° In California, a
25. Majewsky v. Empire Constr. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 478, 481-82, 467 P.2d 547, 549,
85 Cal. Rptr. 819, 821 (1970).
26. G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 74, at 195 (4th ed. 1963).
27. Id.
28. 2 Cal. 3d at 485-86, 467 P.2d 547, 549, 85 Cal. Rptr. 821 at 824.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 440, comment h (1959) (emphasis
added). But see Shanahan v. Crompton, 92 Cal. 9, 28 P. 50 (1891); Padilla v. Padilla, 38 Cal. App. 2d 319, 100 P.2d 1093 (1940). These two cases are distinguishable
from Majewsky because the parties involved were husband and wife and the funds used
to pay for the property were community property. The respective courts held that the
relationship of the parties established the necessary intent despite the lack of consent.
30. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937).
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constructive trust arises whenever a person gains something "by fraud,
accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other
"..", The person unjustly enriched becomes construcwrongful act. .
for the benefit of the person who
of
the
thing possessed
tive trustee
32
it.
had
have
otherwise
would
In his dissent3 3 Justice Tobriner offered a theory for the imposition of a constructive trust in Majewsky. He reasoned that the Waughs
were guilty of a breach of warranty by their failure to disclose the judgment liens against themselves. The grant deed which the Waughs
submitted into escrow warranted as a matter of law that the estate to be
conveyed was free from judgment liens incurred by the transferor. 4
Since the property was in fact subject to judgment liens, the Waughs
breached the warranty upon delivery of the deed into escrow. Failure
to disclose the judgment liens was fraudulent, if the Waughs knew or
should have known of their existence. If, on the other hand, the
Waughs were justifiably unaware of the liens, the transaction was nevertheless based on a mutual mistake of fact. Either fraud or mistake is
a ground for the imposition of a constructive trust.3 5
The unjust enrichment was clear from the record. Before the title
company could distribute the money received from the Majewskys, it
had to receive a deed from the Waughs to them. 36 Misled by the
Waughs' deed, whose warranties could not be performed, the title company distributed the money. Since the warranties were breached, this
distribution, in accordance with the escrow instructions, constituted a
misappropriation of the money, which should have been impressed
with a constructive trust in the hands of the Waughs. But the Cuslidges acquired the $11,000 as innocent purchasers for value without
notice, and equity cannot follow trust property when it passes into the
possession of a bona fide purchaser. 8 Equity can, however, follow
the misappropriated trust property into its product,38 provided that the
31.

CAL. Civ. CODE § 2224.

32. Id.
33. 2 Cal. 3d at 489, 467 P.2d at 555, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
34. A grant deed warrants that grantor's estate is "free from encumbrances done,
made or suffered by the grantor...." CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1113. "Encumbrances" includes "all liens upon real property." CAL. Civ. CODE § 1114.
35. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 2224.
36. Kelly v. Steinberg, 148 Cal. App. 2d 211, 306 P.2d 955 (1957).
37. Estate of Lyon, 163 Cal. 803, 127 P. 75 (1912); Nidever v. Ayers, 83 Cal.
39, 23 P. 192 (1890).
38. G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw oF TRuSrS § 161, at 418 (4th ed. 1963).
"If A is a trustee for B, and the original trust res is certain land, A violates the trust
by selling the land to X... [when] A then deposits the proceeds of the sale in a bank
to the credit of A personally; ... EB] may follow the proceeds of the original property
into the bank account. .. ." Id.
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original property is clearly traceable. 39 Here, the product of the $11,000
was the land in question, and a constructive trust could have been
placed on it as it was clearly identifiable as the product of the purchase
money. The $1,500 which the Waughs kept as their profit would also
40
be subject to the trust.
The majority in Majewsky dismissed the theory of a constructive
trust as a possible remedy, concluding that the Waughs were neither
guilty of any wrongdoing, nor unjustly enriched. 4 1 The court said that
the Waughs did not intentionally use the Majewskys' funds to purchase
the property:
It is only when the entire middleman escrow, after being closed,
is viewed in retrospect that one may say that in effect the Waughs
used the funds. But the establishing of a single escrow was due
solely to a decision and practice of the title company. . . . [When
it was called upon to make a simultaneous closing of the two escrows, the company] took the "short-cut" of crediting the Waughs
with $12,500 coming from the Majewskys'
[sic] and debiting them
42
with the $11,000 due the Cuslidges.
The court, however, missed the point. As Justice Tobriner argued,
the Waughs' submission of an invalid warranty deed constituted the
wrongful act which resulted in the misappropriation of the Majewskys'
money.
The court's conclusion that the Waughs were not unjustly enriched is equally fallacious. The apparent basis for this conclusion
is the belief that the mere use of the Majewsky's money to facilitate
transfer of Blackacre to the Waughs did not of itself amount to unjust
enrichment.4 3 This conclusion would be correct if the benefit which
accrued to the Waughs through the use of the money had only been
momentary and without detriment to the Majewskys. But the plaintiffs did suffer a considerable pecuniary loss. The Waughs received
a $1,500 profit from the sale and, since a constructive trust was not imposed, the property was applied to reduce their outstanding indebtedness. In return, the Majewskys received real property so encumbered
with liens that it is virtually valueless. 44 To prevent the Waughs' unjust enrichment, a constructive trust should have been impressed upon
their $1,500 profit and the property in question. As involuntary trustees, the Waughs would never have acquired more than naked legal
39. People v. California Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 175 Cal. 756, 759, 167 P. 388,
389 (1917); Wells, Fargo& Co. v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 133, 140 (1859).
40. Majewsky v. Empire Constr. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 478, 491, 467 P.2d 547, 556,
85 Cal. Rptr. 819, 828 (1970).
41. Id. at 486, 467 P.2d at 553, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 490, 467 P.2d at 556, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
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45
title to the property, an interest to which judgment liens cannot attach.
Under Justice Tobriner's theory all the elements for a constructive
trust were present: misfeasance by the Waughs resulting in their own
unjust enrichment to the detriment of the Majewskys. The court
was in error, therefore, for failing to apply this remedy. It is true, of
course, that the Majewskys had, in the alternative, an action for breach
of warranty against the Waughs. It would have been futile to pursue
this remedy, however, as the Waughs were obviously insolvent. Rather,
on the basis of a constructive trust theory, the Majewskys should have
been permitted to recover that for which they bargained-the property.

C. Equitable Conversion
Finally, the doctrine of equitable conversion could have been applied in Majewsky. This remedy, unlike a resulting or constructive
trust, does not arise by operation of law. It is utilized by a court having
equitable powers only when essential to achieving manifest justice.4 6 It
was obviously unjust for the Majewskys to provide $12,500 consideration for real property and not receive that property. Although the court
did not consider the concept of equitable conversion, it will be useful
to apply it to the facts of the case, for such application will clearly demonstrate that the Waughs had no interest to which a judgment lien
could attach.
Equitable conversion is a fiction,47 based on the premise that
equity regards as done that which ought to have been done.4" It provides that when a specifically enforceable contract for the sale of land
is executed, the vendee is deemed the equitable owner of the real
property, and the vendor the owner of the purchase money.49 In Majewsky, when the contract between the Cuslidges and the Waughs was
executed, the former retained the legal title and received an equitable
lien on the land for the purchase price; the latter acquired an equitable
interest in Blackacre.5 0 Upon the execution of the contract between
the Waughs and the Majewskys, the equitable interest in Blackacre
45. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
46. In re Estate of Gracey, 200 Cal. 482, 253 P. 921, 925 (1927); Vigli v. Davis,
79 Cal. App. 2d 237, 179 P.2d 586, 597 (1947).
47. Parr-Richmond Indus. Corp. v. Boyd, 43 Cal. 2d 157, 165-66, 272 P.2d 16, 22
(1954); Vigli v. Davis, 79 Cal. App. 2d 237, 255, 179 P.2d 586, 597 (1947).
48. Parr-Richmond Indus. Corp. v. Boyd, 43 Cal. 2d 157, 165-66, 272 P.2d 16,
22 (1954); Hanes v. Throckmorton, 57 Cal. 368, 382-83 (1881).
49. In re Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 664, 675, 115 P. 235, 240 (1911); Vigli v.

Davis, 79 Cal. App. 2d 237, 254-55, 179 P.2d 586, 597 (1947).
50. This equitable interest was not subject to the attachment of judgment liens.
People ex rel. Ford v. Irwin, 14 Cal. 428, 434 (1959); Poindexter v. Los Angeles
Stone Co., 60 Cal. App. 686, 688, 214 P. 241, 242 (1923); Belieu v. Power, 54 Cal.
App. 244, 247, 201 P. 620, 621 (1921); Cockerill, Equitable Conversion in California,
1 S. CAL. L. REv. 309, 319 (1928).
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passed to the Majewskys, while the legal title remained in the Cuslidges. 51
This interest, however, was only naked legal title.52 When the escrow
was closed the title passed from the Cuslidges to the Waughs to the Majewskys. Since the Cuslidges had already divested themselves of the
equitable estate, however, only naked legal title passed from them. Furthermore, since the equitable estate was in the Majewskys prior to the
closing of the escrow, the Waughs were in effect no more than a mere
conduit for passage of title.53 Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, therefore, the Waughs never acquired the fully merged real property interest necessary to support the attachment of judgment liens.
They successively possessed the equitable interest and naked legal title,
interests to which no judgment liens could attach. 54
The basic requirement for the application of the equitable conversion doctrine is that the contract be capable of specific performance
at the time of execution.5 5 If the vendor does not have the title he
agreed to convey, there can be no specific performance, and consequently no equitable conversion.5" This requirement presents no problem in relation to the contract between the Cuslidges and the Waughs,
of course, because the Cuslidges obviously had title when they executed
their agreement. However, it does raise the question whether the interest the Waughs possessed at the time they entered into the agreement
with the Majewskys was sufficient to render this contract specifically
enforceable. Technically, the Waughs had no title, but under the contract with the Cuslidges, they did have an equitable interest in the property and the right to claim legal title upon performance. This interest is
deemed sufficient to make the subsequent contract between the Waughs
and the Majewskys specifically enforceable.5" In fact, in a suit for specific performance, the Majewskys could compel the Cuslidges to transfer the legal title to himself.58
51. In one case "a contract by purchaser to sell to a third person, while purchaser's contract with vendor was still executory, was treated as a conveyance of

purchaser's equitable ownership, the same as an assignment."

Pound, The Progress of

the Law, 1918-1919, 33 HAiv. L. REV. 813, 822 (1920), citing Miedema v. Wormhoudt,
288 I11. 537, 541, 123 N.E. 596, 598 (1919).
52. In re Estate of Reid, 26 Cal. App. 2d 362, 369, 79 P.2d 451, 455-56 (1938);

Hunt v. Inner Harbor Land Co., 61 Cal. App. 271, 273, 214 P. 998, 999 (1923).
53. When one is a mere conduit, there is no interest to which a judgment lien can
attach.

Zenda Mining & Milling Co. v. Tiffin, 11 Cal. App. 62, 65, 104 P. 10, 12

(1909).
54.
55.
56.

See text accompanying notes 8 & 10 supra.
H. cVIcCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 286-87 (2d ed. 1940).
Parr-Richmond Indus. Corp. v. Boyd, 43 Cal. 2d 157, 168, 272 P.2d 16, 24

(1954).
57. Miller v. Dyer, 20 Cal. 2d 526, 529, 127 P.2d 901, 902 (1942); Friedrich
v. Roland, 95 Cal. App. 2d 543, 550, 213 P.2d 423, 427 (1950).
58. Miller v. Dyer, 20 Cal. 2d 526, 530, 127 P.2d 901, 903 (1942).
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Conclusion
Despite the availability of the three aforementioned theories, the
court refused to protect the Majewskys' interest in the property. Two
factors appear primarily responsible for this result. First, the factual
context of the case was a hybrid. Since the operative facts of the case
were similar to those of the classic textbook illustration of a resulting
trust, the court considered this theory as if it were the only viable solution. The Majewskys' ignorance of the Waughs' participation in the
transaction, however, rendered this theory inapplicable. Without knowledge of the transfer of title to the Waughs, the Majewskys could not
have consented thereto, and consequently there was no basis for the
necessary inference that the transfer was a product of the mutual intent
of the parties to create a trust. Without the requisite intent, the theory
of resulting trust crumbled. 59
Despite the outward similarities to a resulting trust, the situation
was ripe for the imposition of a constructive trust. Under Justice Tobriner's theory, all the essentials for a constructive trust were present,
viz: the Waughs' commission of a wrongful act, their consequential
unjust enrichment, and the detriment to the Majewskys' interest in the
land."0 But here the second critical factor influenced the court's decision. The Waughs, in the view of the court, were innocent of any intentional wrongdoing. 61 The court's erroneous failure to impress the
property with a constructive trust was based upon the absence of any
scheme by the Waughs to defraud the Majewskys. Good faith, however, is no defense against a constructive trust. 62 Despite the Waughs'
good faith, they wrongfully caused the misappropriation of the purchase money. A trust should have been impressed on the product of
that money. The court was in error for its failure to invoke this remedy.
The same just result would have been achieved under the theory
of equitable conversion. Moreover, neither the confusing factual nature
of the case nor the Waughs' ostensible good faith would have affected
its application. The theory is solely dependent upon the execution
of a specifically enforceable land sale contract. 63 It is therefore exempt
from the many mechanical requisites of resulting and constructive trusts
which turned the court's deliberations into an exercise in form rather
59. See text accompanying notes 19-29 supra.
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2224.
61. Majewsky v. Empire Constr. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 478, 486, 467 P.2d 547, 553,
85 Cal. Rptr. 819, 825 (1970).
62. Lakin v. Sierra Buttes Gold Mining Co., 25 F. 337, 341 (9th Cir. 1885).
63. See note 55 supra.
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than justice. The sole rationale for the application of equitable conversion is the achievement of justice, a result which the decision in
Majewsky unfortunately failed to attain.
Jon S. Malsnee*
*
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